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Abstract. In this article it is argued that the position of children can be improved 
by ensuring them political representation, through inclusion in democratic 
processes. Embedding children as equal participants in democratic processes is 
likely to diminish the structural disadvantages to which they are currently 
subjected within modern democracies. Political and social institutions will have 
greater incentives to act proactively to support children, and children will have the 
same ability as other citizens to express their approval or disapproval of public 
actions undertaken on their behalf. In a global environment still characterised 
primarily by independent nation states, democracies provide the most fertile 
ground for the generation of just institutions. Those institutions work best, for the 
most active participants in the democracy. Children are, in all states, expressly 
excluded from active political participation, and as such their voices, desires, needs 
and rights are marginalised. Political inclusion for children is a first step to address 
this marginalisation. 
Keywords: enfranchisement; voting; democracy; justice; children. 
Sumário. Neste artigo argumenta-se que a posição das crianças pode ser 
melhorada se lhes for concedida representação política, mediante a sua inclusão 
nos processos democráticos. A inclusão das crianças como participantes iguais nos 
processos democráticos provavelmente atenuará as desvantagens estruturais a 
que estão sujeitas nas democracias contemporâneas. As instituições políticas e 
sociais terão maiores incentivos para agir de forma proactiva no sentido de apoiar 
as crianças, e as crianças terão a mesma capacidade dos demais cidadãos para 
exprimirem a sua aprovação ou rejeição em relação às ações públicas realizadas 
em seu nome. Num ambiente global ainda caracterizado principalmente por 
estados-nação independentes, as democracias oferecem o solo mais fértil para a 
criação de instituições justas. Essas instituições funcionam primacialmente para 
os que mais participam na democracia. As crianças estão, em todos os estados, 
expressamente excluídas da participação política ativa, e, nessa medida, as suas 
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vozes, desejos, necessidades e direitos são marginalizados. A inclusão política das 
crianças é um primeiro passo para solucionar esta marginalização. 
Palavras-chave: emancipação; votação; democracia; justiça; crianças. 
 
0. Introduction 
Each state within the global community is free to develop its own approach 
to the treatment of children. While members of the international community 
learn from each other regarding advancements in justice for children, the pace of 
improvement in the position of children has been slow. By comparison to the 
progress made in securing justice for women, persons with disabilities, or 
members of the LGBTQI+ community, the global position of children has 
remained stagnant. One partial explanation for the pace of change for children, 
is that the advocates for global justice for children are not children themselves. 
Unlike advocacy for global justice for the other groups mentioned above, 
advocacy for children is primarily enacted on behalf of children by others. This 
happens because children are, in all states, expressly excluded from active 
political participation (the primary expression of which is voting), and as such 
their voices, desires, needs and rights are marginalised. They cannot demand that 
governments heed their voices. An important feature of global advocacy for other 
groups is that evidence of the ability of the disadvantaged group is available. 
Women in Saudi Arabia can point to the successes of women elsewhere in 
articulating the flaws in the current Saudi Arabian regime. LGBTQI+ advocates 
in those states that discriminate against them, can make their case with reference 
to the situation in less discriminatory nations. Yet for children, regardless of the 
state, there remains widespread discrimination. 
In this article, I first outline the present disadvantages children as a group 
face, and claim that in order to overcome these disadvantages, children need to 
be included in the political structures of societies. This must, given the current 
global structure, be done on a state by state basis. Those states which are early 
adopters of inclusive policies regarding political participation for young people 
will provide exemplars for others, gradually making the continued denial of rights 
to these children less and less tenable. By inclusion of children I mean, in this 
article, political representation, through inclusion in formal democratic 
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processes. In most states, the primary expression of this is voting. Allowing much 
younger children to vote will help lay the groundwork for the just treatment of 
children not only in the political domain, but also in the areas of social and civil 
rights. I then analyse the position of children with regard to both their democratic 
status and their degree of inclusion in modern societies. I present the case for the 
benefits arising from political inclusion, and I examine the comparisons between 
children and other disadvantaged groups. As Lecce claimed, “children’s political 
disenfranchisement raises serious questions of justice that must be addressed 
rather than ignored” (Lecce, 2009, p. 133). Once children are embedded as equal 
participants in democratic processes, the structural disadvantages they are 
currently subject to within modern democracies will diminish. Political and social 
institutions will have greater incentives to act proactively to support children, and 
children will have the same ability as other citizens to express their approval or 
disapproval of public actions undertaken on their behalf. 
I have elsewhere made the case that the exclusion of children from the 
franchise is unjustified, but in those articles, I have not been concerned with 
developing a positive account of the benefits to democracy and to children, that 
could be gained from their political inclusion. Rather, I had focused solely on the 
injustice of their exclusion (Munn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014). Here, while the injustice 
of the exclusion of children from the franchise remains important, I also explore 
the benefits of inclusion, as a means of further strengthening the case. 
 
1. The Relative Position of Children 
It is clear that children suffer more than the average citizen from a range of 
injustices. For example, if we consider poverty statistics, whether globally or 
within states, children are more likely to be impoverished than the average citizen 
is, and with that poverty comes a range of disadvantages in health and 
educational outcomes, as well as a diminution of future prospects. UNICEF 
(UNICEF, 2017) found that 19.5% of the world’s children live in extreme poverty, 
compared to 9.2% of adults. Once we look at poverty more generally, UNICEF 
note that “[c]hildren represent half of the poor yet are just one third of the 
underlying population” (UNICEF, 2017) These global findings are reflected in 
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comparative poverty rates in most countries, with the OECD noting that 
‘[r]elative poverty rates for children are higher than poverty rates for the total 
population in 28 of the 36 OECD member countries’ (OECD, 2018). Similar data 
is available for other considerations. For example, public spending 
disproportionately goes to the elderly over the young, and in states such as the 
USA, the amount spent on young people is declining, with the 2018 Kids Share 
report noting that in the next ten years, “every major category of spending on 
children (health, education, income security, and so on) is projected to decline 
relative to GDP)” (Isaacs et al., 2018). This data provides evidence of direct 
injustices accruing to children while they are children. Children as a group are, 
then, particularly disadvantaged. Not only do they suffer from higher rates of 
poverty than the population as a whole, but poverty is linked to a range of other 
negative outcomes across the life (Chaudry & Wimer, 2016). There is now, as 
Schweiger notes, “overwhelming evidence that different forms of harm and 
hardship during childhood have long-lasting and severe consequences” 
(Schweiger, 2015, p. 88) which means that the hardships faced as a child 
undermine the wellbeing of the adult in the future. This ought to provide a strong 
incentive for society to reduce these hardships, but it has not yet come to pass. In 
short, injustice in childhood can prevent justice in adulthood. Schweiger claims, 
and is supported by the evidence of Chaudry and Wimer, that “childhood is a 
particular phase of development that has significant influence on the whole life 
course” (Schweiger, 2015, p. 87). Similarly, Bojer notes that “[c]hildren are not a 
separate group, but in a phase of life through which every single human being has 
to pass. Justice to children is therefore not justice to a particular, distinct portion 
of humanity, but justice to all” (Bojer, 2000, p. 26) If these claims are correct, 
then one obvious reason to take injustice for children seriously, is that it 
influences the likelihood of the adults they will become, leading good lives. So, in 
addition to the direct injustices described above, we have evidence of indirect 
injustices, accruing to children who suffer childhood disadvantage, once they 
become adults. I take it that both these types of injustice are concerning, and to 
be addressed. 
So, we are in a situation where children, as a group, are disadvantaged by 
comparison to the general population. This is not, of course, a novel observation, 
but it illustrates a gap between rhetoric and action, one which our current 
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treatment of children only exacerbates. Nicola Ansell has claimed that “[i]f the 
lives of children and youth are to improve, political change is needed. Yet the 
widespread rhetorical support for children’s issues rests on them being 
considered apolitical” (Ansell, 2004, p. 246). This recognises that, in most 
democracies, children are seen as a group to be dictated to, rather than consulted 
with, regarding what is best for them. If children are recognised as being political 
agents, it becomes much harder to justify the status quo in which we 
systematically exclude them from political participation.  
 
2. Democracy, Inclusion and Children 
It seems clear that our democratic institutions, as currently constituted, do 
not suffice to improve the lot of children. Children remain too likely to be living 
in poverty, and to suffer from a range of other disadvantages, both during 
childhood, and consequently through the remainder of their lives. This likelihood 
has not significantly changed, even while other identifiably disadvantaged groups 
have successfully argued for, and achieved, improvements in their wellbeing. I 
claim that meaningful political inclusion is an important tool for changing the 
position of groups in society for the better. While political inclusion does not in 
itself guarantee that one’s situation will improve, the absence of political 
inclusion significantly undermines the motivation for government to assist the 
excluded group. It is easy to see how this undermining occurs. As Lansdown 
observed, “[m]uch of government policy impacts directly or indirectly on young 
people’s lives, yet it is developed and delivered largely in ignorance of how it will 
affect the day-to-day lives of young people, their present and future well-being” 
(Lansdown, 2001, p. 6). When children are not politically included, and when 
consultation with them proceeds without an acknowledgement that the children 
being consulted in fact have the relevant knowledge that those consulting them 
lack, it ought not to surprise us that the outcomes of government policy are not 
ideal.  
Democratic states provide the most fertile ground for the generation of just 
institutions, as, for all its failings, democracy serves to make the status of citizens 
a desideratum for the government of the state. However, the distribution of the 
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benefits of democratic institutions is unequal. These institutions work best, for 
those who are the most active participants in the democracy, and to be an active 
participant means, in the majority of cases, to be a voter. This is simply because 
extant democracies remain primarily aggregative. It is only through voting, 
whether in elections or referenda, that the will of the people directly controls the 
composition of the government, and it is through voting that voters may 
demonstrate their (dis)pleasure at the policies any particular government enacts. 
Deliberation is seldom (if ever) mandated in practice, and while there is 
important work being done on the potential advantages of deliberative systems 
of democracy, none of these systems are likely to be implemented soon. As such 
my assumption is that if the inclusion I am proposing occurs, it will do so within 
a broadly aggregative system, and as such, inclusion in the structures of voting is 
the most important consideration for the position of children. 
The identifiable groups who vote in large numbers are more important 
targets for policy-makers and party strategists, than are those who seldom vote. 
Justice in political participation is improved by reducing inequalities in 
participation rates between groups within a state. Doing so provides governments 
with incentives to value the opinions, beliefs, goals and desires of members of 
these groups more equally. This description of justice through political equality 
does not, however, provide any succour for children. This is because children are, 
in all states, expressly excluded from formal political participation, and as such 
their voices, desires, needs and rights are marginalised. While children are 
usually entitled to participate in informal political engagements, such as the 
expression of political beliefs and preferences, in contexts such as schools, they 
are excluded from the methods which, quite literally, count. I will argue that 
political inclusion for children is a first step to address this marginalisation.  
In this discussion I will assume that, in the states I am considering, there is 
for the other citizens a generally high level of justice available to them. That is, I 
am interested in, firstly, how children in developed democratic states can pursue 
justice, and secondly, in how the example of a just approach to children and 
childhood, embarked upon by these states, could serve as an example to other 
states which helps to guide their transition towards justness. By children in this 
context, I mean the group covered by the United Nations Convention on the 
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Rights of the Child, that is, all those under the age of eighteen (except where the 
age of majority is set lower than eighteen) (United Nations, 1989). Before 
continuing, I will examine both how to cash out the idea of inclusion for children, 
and the kinds of democratic state in which such inclusion should operate. 
2.1. Inclusion 
What does it mean to be politically included? In a deliberative democracy, 
being equitably part of the deliberative process which leads to political decisions 
would suffice. However, extant democracies are not deliberative, and so merely 
having a voice in public discussions and deliberations is insufficient to establish 
political inclusion. While there is a sense in which the presence of an NGO 
advocating for children’s rights provides some formal representation of children’s 
issues into the political domain, that NGO cannot vote in elections, and so under 
an aggregative system, no functional inclusion of children can arise in this 
manner. For better or worse, the democracies we currently have are aggregative, 
with the means of aggregation varying somewhat between systems. As such, 
meaningful political inclusion in these democracies is inextricably connected to 
voting rights. 
Of course, such connection does not mean that the only way to include 
children is via giving them full voting rights. One could argue for proportional 
voting rights, such that the vote of a young child is worth some fraction of a full 
adult vote, and the fraction increases each cycle until it reaches a full vote at a 
time corresponding to the current age of majority (Rehfeld, 2011). Another option 
would be to grant proxy votes to parents or caregivers until such time as children 
reach the age of majority, thereby enabling their interests to be taken into 
consideration without burdening the child with the responsibility of voting (Wolf, 
Goldschmidt, & Petersen, 2015; Wall, 2014). I take it, however, that it is both 
simpler and more defensible to let children vote once they can competently do so 
(Munn, 2012b). Further, I believe that many very young children can do so, which 
means that the group excluded after accounting for capacity for political 
participation is relatively small (Munn, 2018). For those children in this 
remaining group, I believe that proxy votes are a better way to enable political 
inclusion than fractional votes, and that either would be superior to the status 
quo. This raises the issue, of why we ought not to resolve the inclusion of children 
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simply by granting all of them votes by proxy. Proxy voting would give political 
power to children, while not requiring states to engage in the determination of 
voting competence. However, such a resolution would not be defensible, as we 
already know that many children are capable of voting competently, so only 
allowing them to vote by proxy still entails an unjust treatment of them, by 
comparison to other citizens (Munn, 2018, p. 611). Inclusion is a means of 
satisfying particular rights (to political participation). It is also a formal 
recognition of certain capacities (again, the capacity for political participation). I 
am not arguing, here, for inclusion as a voter, irrespective of the capability to vote. 
But I am arguing that those without the capacity should nevertheless be 
recognized via proxy votes, as there is value to be gained via these children having 
a voice, even if they cannot exercise it themselves. 
The preceding discussion makes it clear that my position re the inclusion of 
children is reliant on their capability for political engagement. Justice requires 
that a capable child be allowed to exercise that capacity, and exercising the 
capacity can only occur through formal inclusion as a voter. This aligns my 
approach with, amongst others, Dixon & Nussbaum, who claimed that “those 
interested in theorizing the entitlements of children should prefer the CA [to 
theories of the social contract]” (Dixon & Nussbaum, 2012, p. 553). Similarly, 
Schweiger and Graf (2016), and Graf, Schweiger, and Cabezas (2016), have 
developed capability-based accounts of justice for children. While my approach 
is similar to these, none of them argue for the inclusion of children in the manner 
I do. I will be utilising these accounts to ground both my claims that children 
suffer injustice, and that political inclusion provides a pathway to overcoming 
said injustice. 
2.2. The Position of Children 
Schweiger & Graf’s account begins with a recognition that children are both 
vulnerable and dependent on others for their wellbeing and well-becoming 
(Schweiger & Graf, 2016, p. 103). It is through childhood that people develop the 
ability to be a well-rounded adult. They claim that a capability/functioning based 
approach to justice for children is appropriate, because focusing on capabilities 
and functionings enables us to monitor what children “are actually able to do and 
be” (Schweiger & Graf, 2016, p. 104). Such an approach is superior to a resource 
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based account, because resources are merely means to the end (well-being & well-
becoming), and do not of themselves guarantee that children with them in fact 
have the capability to live well. Having set up the general account of 
capabilities/functionings, Schweiger & Graf argue that four such capabilities are 
particularly relevant to social justice for children, namely health, education, self-
respect and inclusion. These four capabilities, they note, are commonly held by 
capability theorists to be intrinsically valuable elements of a good human life 
(Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999; Alkire, 2002), and they all have instrumental value, 
in that access to health, education, self-respect and inclusion in childhood, and 
continued access to these things throughout one’s life, helps the individual to 
achieve a range of other goods (Schweiger & Graf, 2016, p. 106). It should be 
noted that I, like Schweiger & Graf, take both capabilities and functionings to be 
relevant to children, and as such, I disagree with Anderson, who claims that “the 
relevant standard of justice [with respect to children] is in terms of functionings, 
not capabilities” (Anderson, 2010, p. 84). In this context, ‘functionings’ are the 
states of human beings and the things that those human beings do, while 
‘capabilities’ are the (real) freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings 
(Robeyns, 2016). Anderson takes functionings but not capabilities to be relevant 
to children as, on her account, “[c]hildren lack the autonomy to choose for 
themselves. Bare opportunities are of no value to children unless adults in their 
lives place them in those opportunities” (Anderson, 2010, p. 84). However, this 
is true, at best, for a small subset of children, and for particular capacities. As we 
are utilising the United Nations definition of a child, which covers all those aged 
under eighteen, it is clear that such a rejection is not tenable for everyone under 
consideration. Sixteen and seventeen year olds are widely held to be capable of 
autonomous choice. But the capacity for autonomous choice in many domains 
extends much further into childhood than has commonly been recognised. For 
example, many children, from ages as young as ten (or even lower, in certain 
circumstances) demonstrably have the autonomy to choose for themselves in 
making decisions regarding their own health, and this autonomy is recognised in 
law in those states which allow children to make decisions regarding medical 
treatment (Gillick v West Norfolk AHA, 1985). The Gillick standard specifically 
rejects the idea that a fixed age can be used as the sole determinant of competence 
in these cases. In such a case, justice for children consists in their capabilities 
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being recognised, and their being allowed to choose their own path to well-being. 
We can contrast this with the political case (paralleling, in this instance, the 
fourth central capability, inclusion). There are many children who have the ability 
and desire to make political decisions, and thereby to be politically included in 
the structure and governance of their state. However, none of these children are 
allowed to do so. The proposal is that those children with the functional ability to 
make political decisions, who are denied the capability to do so by (unjust) laws 
regarding the age of political majority, ought not to be so denied. I do not claim 
that lowering the voting age is sufficient to resolve the injustice, but as long as 
voting retains its centrality in political processes, lowering the voting age will 
significantly improve the lot of children.  
Children are currently subject to a range of structural disadvantages, 
regardless of which state they live in. No country recognises the political capacity 
of all children (and most do not recognise any children as having the political 
capacity required to vote, while a small number of democracies allow older 
children, 16 & 17 years old, to do so). A similar (but less widespread) logic rejects 
the autonomy of children in medical decision-making, thereby subordinating 
their beliefs, desires and goals to those of their parents, or even completely 
rejecting the goals of the child. Simultaneously with this refusal to acknowledge 
the agency of the child in political and medical matters, most of these same 
countries ascribe criminal agency to children, making them eligible for criminal 
punishment for illegal behaviour while denying them access to civil, social and 
political goods (Melchiorre, 2004; UNICEF, 1998). This inconsistency in the 
attribution of agency generates a core injustice in society’s treatment of children. 
For the moment, I am focused on the question of political participation, and the 
attribution of formal rights of political participation via voting in elections. I will 
assume that electoral inclusion is distinct from electoral compulsion, that is, that 
the voting system into which I argue we should incorporate children, is voluntary, 
and will not compel them to participate.  
Schweiger and Graf focus on the functionings of health, education, self-
respect and inclusion when discussing justice for children. They choose these 
capabilities/functionings as they are of “particular relevance to social justice for 
children” (Schweiger & Graf, 2016, p. 106). The failure of all democratic states to 
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enfranchise children clearly undermines both the self-respect and the inclusion 
of children, and it seems reasonable to believe that the exclusion of children from 
the franchise undermines their ability to argue for better health and education 
outcomes for themselves, and thereby puts the capabilities of children in both 
these respects at a disadvantage, comparative to the population as a whole. As 
Maura Priest argued, in making a more general point about disenfranchisement, 
“[e]xclusion from democratic decisions disrespects the judgment and worth of 
the excluded party” (Priest, 2016, p. 22). As it is for people in general, so it is for 
children. Children have no choice but to live within the state they reside in, and 
they are refused access to the primary means of influencing government – voting. 
Yet despite this, they are, as I noted earlier, compelled to follow the laws of the 
state. As Priest notes, “[i]t is hard to think of a more straightforward example of 
a democratic injustice” (Priest, 2016, p. 22). 
So, children in states that we otherwise think of as exemplars of good 
governance are in a position of political impotence. They cannot directly 
participate in democratic processes. Those who can in theory advocate for their 
interests (parents, for example) are at best partially driven by the interests of the 
child, and must balance this against their own interests. This makes children 
functionally subjects rather than citizens. They are disenfranchised, and the 
political disenfranchisement of children is coupled with a rejection of the value of 
children’s opinions, goals, and desires. I argue that one important vector through 
which to improve the global position of children is by ensuring them political 
representation, through inclusion in democratic processes from a young age. 
Once children are embedded as equal participants in democratic processes, we 
can hope to see the structural disadvantages they are currently subject to within 
modern democracies diminish. Political and social institutions will have greater 
incentives to act proactively to support children, and children will over time come 
to have the same ability as other citizens to express their approval or disapproval 
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3. The Benefits of Political Inclusion 
The claim that individuals and groups benefit from political inclusion is not 
particularly controversial. While some have recently argued that democracy is not 
as beneficial as it has been thought to be (Brennan, 2016; Caplan, 2011; Guerrero, 
2014), the dominant position within political theory remains pro-democracy. The 
benefits of democracy are seen in terms of justice: a more democratic society is, 
other things being equal, less prone to injustice, and more capable of correcting 
for injustices than a less democratic society. However, these benefits accrue 
unevenly to citizens within a democracy. The degree to which members of 
identifiable groups within society benefit from the institutions of that society is 
linked to their propensity to vote. So for example, we see a common pattern in 
advanced democratic states, in which spending on the elderly (the group most 
likely to vote) is higher than spending for other groups, and is much higher than 
the spending on children. In the EU, for example, the ratio of social spending on 
the elderly to social spending on the young remained at roughly three from 1990 
until 2003 (Börsch-Supan, 2007). More recent data from the US and UK shows 
the issue remains. (Isaacs, 2009; Kelly, Lee, Sibieta, & Waters, 2018)  
An interest in justice is therefore enhanced by having as inclusive a 
democracy as possible. As Iris Marion Young argues, “[n]ot only does the explicit 
inclusion of different groups in democratic discussion and decision-making 
increase the likelihood of promoting justice because the interests of all are taken 
into account. It also increases that likelihood by increasing the store of social 
knowledge available to participants” (Young, 2002, p. 83). While Young does not 
explicitly argue for the inclusion of children on grounds of justice, it is easy to 
extrapolate such a position from this claim. Children are not currently included 
in democratic decision-making, as they cannot vote (and inclusion without voting 
does not carry the same power as voting does). As children are not included, their 
interests are not (sufficiently) accounted for. This diminishes the likelihood that 
democratic decisions made by the state will promote justice for children. The 
argument runs similarly for the second advantage Young notes arising from 
broader inclusion: while children are excluded, the social knowledge of childhood 
that is considered is only the remembered knowledge of adults; the things they 
think they wanted (or should have wanted), when they were children. When 
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children are included, then the things children actually want, must be taken more 
seriously by the state. 
This expansion of Young’s position links Young’s arguments to those 
considered by Dixon & Nussbaum, who in considering the political inclusion of 
children noted that “[a]nother potential reason for children to be granted the 
right to vote, for example, is that it may help overcome a systematic failure by 
democratic policy makers, in a particular national context, to pay attention to the 
needs and interests of children” (Dixon & Nussbaum, 2012, fn.565). Currently, all 
democratic contexts have this problematic feature, because no democratic 
context is one in which children have equal rights to political participation. As 
such, there is potential for the improvement of global justice for children through 
the institution in any particular context of equal political participation for 
children – the state which did this would be an exemplar, whether of the risks or 
the benefits of inclusion. For reasons I have discussed elsewhere, at length, I am 
convinced that the result of such a move towards the inclusion of the young would 
be beneficial, not just for the children who are enfranchised, but for the 
democracy which enfranchises them, and for the other citizens within that 
democracy (Munn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2018). This is because democratic 
participation is a means to a range of positive ends, or, as Lansdown puts it, 
“democratic participation is not just an end in itself. It is also a procedural right 
through which to realize other rights, achieve justice, influence outcomes and 
expose abuses of power” (Lansdown, 2004, p. 5). 
I have so far considered the benefits of political inclusion generally. Now, I 
return to the four capabilities put forward by Schweiger & Graf as fundamentally 
important to justice for children: health, education, self-respect and inclusion 
(Schweiger & Graf, 2016). Political inclusion of children recognises their capacity 
as citizens, and grants them a status equivalent to other citizens within the state. 
While no children are currently included in such a manner, many children ought 
to be. The requirements for demonstrated capacity amongst adult citizens are 
minimal, so it should not be controversial that many currently excluded children 
in fact have the capability to act as electors. For younger children, who may not 
yet have the capability, the promise of political inclusion once they have 
demonstrated capability links back to the role of education. By this I mean just 
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that if we take education of young children seriously, we can hasten their 
development into active citizens, who we are required to include in political 
decision-making. It also seems clear that the role of the state in supporting 
children’s self-respect is enhanced by granting them political inclusion, as doing 
so entails a recognition on the part of the state of the child as a citizen proper, not 
merely a subject or citizen-in-waiting. Children’s health and education are not as 
directly tied to their political inclusion, but the path from inclusion to better 
health and educational outcomes is straightforward. Other things being equal, 
outcomes improve as more is spent in these areas (particularly when the base 
levels of spending are comparatively low). Currently, spending on things which 
directly benefit health and educational outcomes for children is lower than 
spending in other areas, and it does not seem too cynical to attribute some part 
of the justification for this to children’s current lack of democratic power. As such, 
the cost to governments of lowering expenditures in these areas is minor, 
compared to the cost of, for example, lowering spending on health outcomes for 
the elderly. Similarly, the benefit to governments is comparatively low, as their 
actions cannot be rewarded with votes. Including children in the political system 
makes improving these outcomes more politically salient for states. 
I have to this point focused on the position of children within states, and the 
states I have considered have been well-functioning democracies, wherein 
comparatively high levels of social justice already obtain. There remains the 
question of how I expect the transition from justice within these states to global 
justice, to occur. Unfortunately, I expect it to occur slowly and incrementally, and 
these expectations are generated by the same considerations which make me 
think that children can learn from women, ethnic minorities, and the LGBTQI+ 
community. Many children already have the capacity for political agency, and 
many who do not currently have that capacity will attain it years before they are, 
under the status quo, politically included. That is, it takes a long time for historical 
injustice to be overcome. The effects of historical injustice are still felt by 
members of the aforementioned groups, and will be felt for some time to come. 
But democratic states, when they include members of these groups, provide an 
example to other states of the good that comes from reducing injustice. As more 
states enfranchised women, and as the position of women within states that had 
enfranchised them improved, it became harder for recalcitrant states to continue 
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their unjust discrimination against women. The last holdouts, such as Saudi 
Arabia, have finally begun gradually dismantling the barriers to the political, 
social and civil inclusion of women. Children face a very different position, in that 
the first hesitant steps towards inclusion have been taken comparatively recently, 
by states such as Austria, which lowered the voting age to 16 in 2007 (Wagner, 
Johann, & Kritzinger, 2012). This is a much more incremental change than was 
the enfranchisement of women, as it only extends political inclusion to a small 
group of children, and Austria’s move has not yet been followed by many other 
democracies. However, if the pattern for children follows the pattern for other 
groups, we should see children become better off in states which include them, 
and the social, civil and political injustices children currently face will slowly 
diminish as they are recognised and treated as full participants in their societies. 
 
4. Comparing Children with Other Groups 
Political rights contribute to the development of just societies. Children are, 
as detailed above, an example of a group that is, globally, particularly 
disadvantaged. As Nicola Ansell notes, “[y]oung people have thus far been given 
little opportunity to participate in areas that really make a difference” (Ansell, 
2004, p. 245). There are injustices shared by all members of the group ‘children’, 
globally, which are not shared by all members of other globally distributed 
groups. For example, while some states restrict political participation for those 
with cognitive disabilities, all states do so for children. While some states impose 
legal inequalities on women or members of the LGBTQI+ community, all states 
do so for children. Considerations like this led Bojer to claim that “[c]hildren may 
well be considered the weakest group in society, the group most unconditionally 
dependent on the goodwill of others. The group “children” is therefore a strong 
candidate for the position of the least advantaged…” (Bojer, 2000, p. 35). In 
attempting to redress this imbalance, it is useful to look at what comparisons can 
be drawn between children and these other identifiable groups, both to learn what 
works in the argument for inclusion, and to learn what to avoid. After all, as 
Reynolds points out, “[w]omen, LGBT people, young people, and the disabled 
share political interests within their respective “groups,” but they are fragmented 
geographically, ethnically, and often ideologically” (Reynolds, 2013, p. 271). This 
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suggests that children share similarities with and can learn from the experiences 
of these other groups. 
A starting point for the examination of the benefits arising from political 
inclusion is to examine other groups who have gained political inclusion, whether 
as members of the voting public (the first step) or via representation in 
parliament. If there are identifiable benefits accruing to these other groups, and 
those benefits are appropriately linked with political inclusion, the existence of 
these benefits provides evidence that inclusion works to generate justice. 
Examples of such groups are not difficult to find. We have evidence from the 
inclusion of a range of other marginalised groups in society that the fact of 
political inclusion is important in the improvement of the social status of the 
group. As Reynolds notes, the literature on the benefits accruing to women and 
ethnic minorities from political inclusion (both as electors and as elected 
representatives) is well established, and the same patterns appear to be present 
more recently for the LGBTQI+ community, for whom increased representation 
is linked to the adoption of policies beneficial to members of the LGBTQI+ 
community (Reynolds, 2013, p. 264).  
One might object that there is an important difference between the current 
global position of children, and that of the other groups just mentioned. That is, 
that for women, ethnic minorities and the LGBTQI+ community, the battle to be 
allowed to participate as an elector has been won for many years, and the current 
battleground is for appropriate levels of representation among the elected 
officials of governments. By contrast, children have not yet achieved the right to 
act as electors, let alone to stand for election. However, I do not believe this 
difference to be material to the matter at hand. Women, ethnic minorities, and 
the LGBTQI+ community all had to gain the right to act as electors before it was 
possible for them to be elected (although, for LGBTQI+ people, the relevant 
consideration was often whether they were able to live as they wished openly or 
legally). Political inclusion via enfranchisement is a first step towards a society in 
which political representation is possible, and it is justice-enhancing insofar as it 
improves the lot of those enfranchised. 
A second style of objection relies on the claim that there is some 
fundamental difference between children and the other groups I have been 
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discussing, such that we have reason to suspect that the positive examples of these 
other groups will not translate into similar outcomes for the young. This claim is 
that the position of children cannot reasonably be compared with the position of 
other groups subject to injustice. Dixon & Nussbaum object in this manner; they 
reject the comparison between children and women, claiming that the position of 
children is “utterly different from that of adult women”, in that adult women 
suffer from an “artificially created infantilization” whereas children are in fact 
immature (Dixon & Nussbaum, 2012, p. 577). So, regarding political inclusion, 
women are politically mature but were treated as immature by the law when it 
excluded them from the franchise. By contrast, children, are and are treated as 
politically immature. However, this differentiation between the position of 
women and that of children only works if children are in fact politically immature. 
Not all of them are. So, in both cases, there is a wrong inflicted, of not having 
interests taken into account, and another wrong, present for many children, of 
being excluded from decision-making despite having the relevant competence for 
political agency. While this latter claim remains controversial, it has been widely 
defended in recent years (Munn, 2012a, 2012b, 2014; Umbers, 2018; Lau, 2012). 
A renewed defence here is beyond the scope of the present article. What matters 
is the capacity to engage in particular actions, and wrongness comes in not 
allowing people to do things they are capable of. Many children are being 
wronged just as women were (and in some instances, still are). Further, if we 
focus on  justice rather than  rights, and it is the case that the lack of rights (such 
as the right to political participation) undermines access to justice, then we have 
an independent reason to try to secure rights for the young, one in which the 
attribution of rights to the young has instrumental value in pursuit of justice. This 
alternative approach is present in Roche, who draws parallels between the 
inclusion of women and that of children, claiming that “just as women have 
altered understandings of citizenship and belonging, a politics inclusive of 
children will produce a further shift in understanding” (Roche, 1999, p. 482). 
While it might be objected, at this point, that children lack participatory capacity, 
such a claim is true for at best some young children, with many (teenagers, say) 
being clearly capable. Perhaps more importantly, it is not clear that the exclusion 
of children on the grounds of incapacity is defensible (Munn, 2018). However, 
this argument is more pertinent in the comparison between children and those 
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with intellectual disabilities, so I will discuss it below. Instead of focusing on the 
individuals being included, Roche’s point is that the structure of our systems 
changes when different perspectives are included, especially when the experience 
of the new inclusions is different from that of the prior group. It is in this sense 
that I believe the comparison between women and children is relevant. How 
politics was conducted changed, once women were included. In its most obvious 
form, this came about because policies which privileged men over women 
suddenly appealed to a much smaller percentage of the voting public. As these 
policies became less successful, they were gradually replaced by policies which 
had wider appeal. The ability to be an active political participant made it easier 
for women to argue for and eventually to achieve a broad range of civil goals 
(Walby, 1992, pp. 90–91). The same could be true, perhaps not for very young 
children, but for many of them. Consider the force of the youth-led protests 
against climate change, the organisation and enactment of which clearly 
demonstrated the autonomous capacity of those involved. The ability to vote for 
these young people would I take it clearly have caused the protests to be more 
influential on political policy, as children who were entitled to vote could directly 
punish parties and candidates who opposed them. 
Achieving political citizenship became one step women took towards full 
social and civil inclusion. As Roche notes, women had to gain political citizenship 
“before they could more substantially advance their social and civil citizenship 
claims” (Roche, 1999, p. 482). In the context of justice for children, the contexts 
in which injustice is most felt are social and civil, and it seems plausible that their 
path to justice could parallel that of women – first, to gain a political voice, and 
then, to use that voice to draw attention to, and eventually to reduce (and 
hopefully, eventually, to eliminate) the present injustices. Williams said that “if 
women enter environments where men have only been talking to men, the 
conversation is bound to change. If blacks enter spaces where whites have only 
been talking to other whites, the conversation is bound to grow somewhat more 
encompassing” (Williams, 1995, p. 93). To this, Roche adds that “the inclusion of 
children in such spaces and conversations would also change things” (Roche, 
1999, p. 488). As I discussed earlier, things need changing. Children are 
disadvantaged compared to the population as a whole, even within otherwise 
relatively just states. 
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While Dixon & Nussbaum reject the comparison between children and 
women, they do point out that there are important similarities between the 
protection of children’s rights and the protection of the rights of persons with 
intellectual disabilities. I would argue that these similarities extend beyond a 
focus on rights, to those duties of justice which we have towards children, and 
those with intellectual disabilities. An important and shared aspect of injustice, 
as faced by those with cognitive disabilities and by children, is that “they are also 
largely overlooked by theories of justice in the social contract tradition” (Dixon & 
Nussbaum, 2012, p. 562). Because neither the cognitively disabled nor the young 
fit the model commonly used in such a tradition, it is easy for their needs to go 
unconsidered. As such, a capabilities approach is valuable in the search for justice 
for children, just as it was for those with cognitive disabilities. Those children who 
in fact lack the capability for political participation ought to be assisted in having 
their needs and desires catered for in the same way as those with intellectual 
disabilities who lack the capability for political participation. But in neither case 
ought we to rush to the claim that these people cannot participate. We should do 
our utmost to offer them the chance to, and only when our efforts to include them 
fail ought we to seek other means. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Children, globally, are subject to significant political, social and civil 
injustice. In no democracy are children entitled to fully participate in political 
processes. Unless and until this situation is remedied, all children in democratic 
societies are denied access to an effective means of improving their social status. 
As I have argued, political inclusion provides a pathway towards civil and social 
inclusion, and children have an opportunity to follow the example of others who 
have gained political, social and civil recognition through arguing for political 
rights, and using those political rights to demand more equitable inclusion in civil 
society. 
Any regime is just, only insofar as those subjected to it have an equal say in 
the decisions made by it. For all children, everywhere in the world, this ability to 
have an influence over their state is non-existent. So, for children, more so than 
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for any other identifiable group in society, there is no safe haven; no place 
wherein they can currently find justice. All states decide for them, and prevent 
them from exercising their rights as articulated in the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. The continued political exclusion of children 
undermines the very possibility of achieving global justice for them, by preventing 
children from having due weight given to their views.1 
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